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Abstract
Hutchinson et al offer a compelling argument for greater attention to and work in corruption in healthcare. We 
indeed need to talk about corruption, to understand and to grasp how to prevent and address it. This paper lays 
out some of the rationale for how to define the research questions, how best to address corruption – arguing 
that governance rather than corruption may offer a preferred starting point, and highlighting some options for 
measuring, analyzing and stemming corruption. 
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Hutchinson et al1 offer a compelling argument for greater attention to and work in corruption in healthcare. We indeed need to talk about corruption, to understand 
and to grasp how to prevent and address it. Corruption entails 
illegal acts that are hidden, and perpetrators benefit from that 
opaqueness. Hence the difficulty of capturing, measuring and 
addressing corruption in the health sector that Hutchinson 
et al rightly lament. Possibly the most insidious and rooted 
corruption is organized crime that deals in counterfeit drugs 
and substandard inputs, which undermine patient treatment. 
Petty crime or pilfering from facilities is at the other extreme. 
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) healthcare 
systems suffer from abuses that can include, among others, 
chronic absenteeism of public sector staff that leads to 
grossly understaffed facilities, under-the-table payments to 
individual physicians, nurses and orderlies where services are 
meant to be free at point of care, outright theft from facilities, 
suspicious public purchasing at various level of the system, or 
empty warehouses that are meant to be a source of drugs and 
supplies. Patients and their families are the victims who suffer 
both the indignity of substandard care and negative effects of 
inadequate or poor care. Desperate patients and their families 
sell assets and borrow to pay for “free” public care to save the 
life of a family member, which drives them into penury.2,3 
Thus the human and financial costs of corruption are not 
insignificant for patients and their families.
An additional challenge is endemic corruption, where illegal 
actions become commonplace and are no longer perceived by 
the perpetrators, and often victims, as abnormal. Purchasing 
of public positions,4 chronic absenteeism5,6 and consistently 
rigged tenders7 offer examples of healthcare corruption and a 
“business as usual” attitude that allows it to persist. As a result 
such practices become part of the fabric of healthcare services.
Corruption not only reduces effectiveness in healthcare, as 
the authors argue, but it also compromises quality. The recent 
Lancet Commission report on Quality of Care8 notes that 
healthcare investments that fail to ensure quality may not be 
worth the outlay, and the US National Academy of Sciences’ 
Crossing the Global Quality Chasm9 devotes a chapter to 
corruption as a major source of poor quality. Impacts on 
inequality also warrant mention as informal payments, one of 
the best researched areas in corruption and healthcare, lead to 
stark inequities in access.10 
Corruption can take various paths. At the extreme is 
national level fraud. One of the best recorded examples of this 
was high level trading in counterfeit drugs in Nigeria in the 
early 2000s, when 70% of drugs in circulation were designated 
as counterfeit; this contributed to unnecessary deaths and the 
exit of major pharmaceutical companies unable to compete 
with illicit producers. Despite death threats and other 
intimidation, Dr. Dora Akunyili, then Director General of 
the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and 
Control, with support from the Minister of Health Obasanjo, 
was able to reduce pharmaceutical corruption, and by her 
departure in 2006, counterfeit drugs comprised just 16.7% of 
the market.11
While the sources of corruption vary, three elements 
systematically stoke illegal acts: opportunity, disincentives for 
honest behavior and lack of accountability. If we restrict this 
discussion to pubic healthcare systems in LMICs, we have a 
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simpler analysis that represents the bulk of the problem and 
can be examined across countries. Lack of accountability may 
be the single greatest source of corruption. The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) 
definition of accountability is “required or expected to justify 
actions or decisions” offers a window into why corruption 
persists, and at such pervasive levels, in many healthcare 
systems. No one is watching, data are scarce, and no one is 
being prosecuted, demoted, suspended or otherwise punished 
for bad behavior. 
Although OECD country healthcare systems are far from 
devoid of corruption,12 the ability to hold public employees 
accountable for their performance and for deviations from 
acceptable norms allow standards to be set and adhered 
to. Defined expectations, availability of data, concern for 
irregularities, systematic audits and penalties for corrupt 
behavior help establish a culture of accountability and a law-
abiding work environment. On a World Bank study tour 
to England and France in the late 1990s, the team queried 
hospitals and clinics whether staff came to work, given that 
they were largely assured lifetime employment. The shock of 
managers and their explanation for how the system worked – 
expectations of performance, reprimands leading to improved 
performance and oversight to ensure continued compliance – 
made it clear that the environments in LMICs looked similar 
to, but operated quite differently from, those in higher-income 
settings where norms of behavior, expectations, oversight and 
accountability predominate.
The same cannot be said for many LMICs. Indeed, there is 
often an attitude of “gaming the system.” We see this to a much 
lesser degree in OECD countries, for example with up-coding 
of diagnosis related groups13,14 or the close relationships 
between suppliers and hospital purchasers, but these are 
universal irregularities that also exist in LMICs. The German 
government attempts to reduce gaming by periodically 
restructuring the rules of the game in healthcare.15 Further, 
the ability to hold all stakeholders accountable allows most 
OECD countries to prevent and stem corruption. At the 
same time, they are bolstered by cultures that do not tolerate 
corruption, and public systems that have the infrastructure 
needed to oversee, identify and largely control corruption. 
That does not imply that corruption does not exist – it very 
much does16 – but rather that efforts to root out and prosecute 
need to persist to continuously counter illegal behavior.
Hutchinson et al1 focus on the unique and blatant 
corruption experiences in LMICs. LMICs face difficulties 
in managing corruption due to the structure of government, 
and the general lack of accountability in the public sector. But 
the structures of healthcare delivery systems contribute as 
well. Publicly-provided healthcare is largely hierarchical with 
often centralized decision-making, which means managers of 
hospitals and clinics lack the authority to manage effectively 
or to intervene when confronted with illegal, unethical or 
undesirable behaviors. Similarly, lower-level staff remain 
victims of behaviors that undermine ethical processes and 
have no power to intervene or even raise issues.4 In such a 
climate, going along is one option; the other is leaving the 
public sector. Neither is ideal, and some staff become trapped 
if they face limited alternative employment options. Relatedly, 
legal enforcement tends to be weak, auditing inadequate 
or excessive (too many layers and auditors can become the 
problem) and prosecution rare. Given such circumstances, 
it is hardly surprising that corruption remains prominent in 
LMIC healthcare systems.
Addressing Corruption
Addressing corruption requires careful strategy and 
opportunistic approaches to expose, explain, understand and 
fix specific problems, which is why data, research and in-
depth understanding of processes are so fundamental. That is 
where the incentives, motivations, opportunity and behaviors 
can be understood and explained, and together provide a 
basis for addressing corruption. Convening stakeholders 
and identifying and understanding how, where and why 
corruption persists offers an ideal first step, and logically leads 
to prioritizing where to focus and how.
Many within the system can be victims of corruption, but are 
tainted nonetheless by association, despite lacking the power 
to influence. This is where I depart from my concurrence with 
the approach of Hutchinson et al,1 as a holistic, confrontational 
approach may backfire. Launching an anti-corruption drive 
frontally can compromise good public managers, and can 
conceivably endanger them. Neither covering up nor taking 
on dangerous colleagues offers a viable alternative: both place 
many in government in awkward positions. That does not 
mean corruption should continue to be ignored.
Given the negative impact of corruption on performance, 
efficiency and quality, launching an effort to raise performance 
and improve governance as a route to undermining corruption 
can provide a carrot to unwrap current practices and expose 
problems, those linked to both corrupt practices and to 
simple mismanagement.6 Often, the line between the two is 
blurred. Attacking both allows more deft and effective ways 
to engage and address problems that impede quality services, 
undermine efficiency and allow poor services to persist, and 
at the same time identify and address corruption. 
Ukraine offers an excellent example of attacking corruption 
through good governance initiatives. In an effort to raise 
performance, the health minister has updated processes 
and payment arrangements in the public system; shifted 
purchasing to transparent, information technology-based 
systems; made internal processes transparent; harnessed 
private delivery networks; and introduced diagnosis related 
groups to allow oversight, budgeting and tracking of hospital 
performance. The decline in waste and leakage of healthcare 
inputs has been measurable, and the responsiveness of public 
providers, who are now incentivized to see patients, has 
improved the image of and support for the public system (U. 
Suprun, oral communication, March 2019). 
Many Eastern European countries addressed issues of 
absenteeism and informal payments in the 2000s based on 
hard evidence in an effort to regain control of their public 
systems. Georgia, for example, has moved to a system based 
on private providers and public funding with public oversight 
of spending, and has seen improvement in performance, and 
implicitly a decline in corruption.17 
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These offer examples of health system-wide efforts to 
root out corruption. How these were achieved and the 
costs and benefits of the results deserve to be understood. 
Research needs to be harnessed to measure the impacts and 
provide a body of evidence to guide policy elsewhere. But 
these anecdotes offer a prime example of how to approach 
corruption: through indirect reforms that strengthen the 
health system and thereby address corruption that is resistant 
to direct interventions.
How to Understand, Measure and Stem Corruption
How to effectively measure corruption plagues all sectors, 
and all sectors similarly struggle to cope and curtail illegal 
practices.18 Successful anti-corruption efforts from various 
countries and sectors suggest concrete starting points for 
healthcare research, and these can encompass multiple 
disciplines and approaches, a valuable suggestion from 
Hutchinson et al. First, a number of countries have stemmed 
corruption at the national level from Poland19 to Rwanda,20 
and these have had knock-on effects on the health sector that 
deserve attention and analysis.
Second, progress in attacking corruption entails reliance 
on measures of corruption. Many indicators are indirect 
because we are, after all, dealing with corruption, but they 
are nonetheless valuable. Research should harness these 
opportunities to get a sense of corruption in countries, 
industries and government. Transparency International, 
Global Integrity, the World Bank, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 
among other anti-corruption organizations, are generating 
indicators that provide a starting point. Collecting data that 
can be exploited for measuring irregularities in healthcare 
either alone or combined with other data is a useful beginning 
to shed light on corruption or irregularities. 
Third, data systems or systematic surveys that track 
performance capture the nature and extent of poor 
performance and corruption, and offer insights on limitations 
in service delivery and financing. Both research questions and 
research itself are supported by such data. Public expenditure 
reviews (https://www.cbd.int/doc/case-studies/inc/PER-
Core.pdf), public expenditure tracking surveys21 and the 
World Bank’s Service Delivery Indicators (https://www.
sdindicators.org/), applied in numerous African countries to 
identify lack of complementary inputs, absenteeism and other 
abuses of the system that translate into under-performance,22 
all provide a source for research on corruption. Harnessing 
Public Expenditure and Financial Analysis to identify and 
figure out how to identify and address the shortcomings 
reflected in the ratings is a low-cost option for helping 
countries simultaneously deal with both weak governance 
and corruption,23 and offers a research opportunity as well. 
Finally, collating and examining existing data in healthcare 
provision suggest another route for research, since most 
countries already collect but never analyze data.
Fourth, directly generating data and information in priority 
areas also holds promise. For example, data gathered through 
focus groups with clinicians, managers and back-room 
support to discuss bottlenecks and problems can often identify 
inappropriate, illegal and inefficient practices24,25; that would 
not be possible through interviews or questionnaires. Spot 
checks of provider performance can help reveal restrictions 
that compromise processes and outcomes. These can be as 
simple as contorted decision-making processes or the lack of 
data use by clinicians. 
Finally, the opportunity for experimentation in interventions 
aimed at prevention and identification of corrupt practices is 
extensive, and largely untapped. For example, few efforts have 
assessed transparency and the role of third parties in tracking 
and reporting on public performance,24 an underutilized 
process for promoting accountability. Similarly, little attention 
has been given to reliance on forensic audits that complement 
the more predictable (and easily compromised) financial 
audits. Assessing the value of financial oversight information 
has promise as there sometimes are too many audits involving 
too many individuals; this can foster illegal behavior as 
supervision is diffuse and allows too many individuals to 
make judgements with too little oversight. Exploiting national 
financial audits for clues regarding use of public funding and 
shortcomings of public practices can help to understand where 
problems are likely to arise. Even those outside the sector 
can provide insights that guide research or investigations. 
Lastly, but importantly, there has been inadequate attention 
to straightforward solutions to procurement. Shifting to 
e-procurement with transparent warehousing and web- or 
phone-based distribution of pharmaceuticals can translate 
into reduced irregularities and improved availability of inputs 
(U. Suprun, oral communication, March 2019).26 It makes 
sense to hire the private suppliers to manage supply chains: 
let pharmaceutical companies deliver drugs, and suppliers 
deliver consumables. This offers a hypothesis and an essential 
area for research.
Initiatives of the nature suggested above rely on quality 
research to unpack, inform and analyze the issues, and on 
identifying the options for preventing and attacking corrupt 
practices. As Hutchinson et al1 point out, little evidence is 
available to guide policy or programs in this area. Much policy 
is based on rumor. Their call to action is well-timed and 
relevant, and the points in this review suggest directions for 
action and investment. Together, such actions initiate a process 
and signal directions of change, laying the groundwork for 
upgrading all aspects of the system and targeting corruption 
in the process.
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